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 Abstract: This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk 
imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and 
social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is 
not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as 
virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. 
However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk is justified when its total 
benefits exceed its total costs faces the standard distributional challenges of 
consequentialism. Forms of contractualism have been proposed as a solution, but how 
exactly such theories can be formulated remains problematic, especially when 
confronted with the difficult cases of mass, novel, risk such as climate change. 
1. Introduction 
John Stuart Mill famously argued that:  
Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, 
either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of 
liberty, and placed in that of morality or law. (Mill 1859/2008: 91) 
Yet as Andreas Teuber notes: 
Philosophers have paid surprisingly little attention to the permissibility of risk 
impositions. If, as we seem to believe, it is wrong to cause another person 
harm without that person’s consent, is it wrong to impose a risk of harm 
without consent? (Teuber 1990: 236) 
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Standard ethical theories run into difficulties when the actions in questions merely 
bring about a risk for harm, damage, or loss. Broadly, consequentialism can often 
seem too permissive, making hard cases too easy, in that it appears to allow any risk 
provided that the benefits outweigh the costs, even when the aggregated benefits 
(however small the benefit to each person) outweigh the aggregated costs (however 
serious the risks, and wherever they fall). Rights theory can seem too restrictive, 
leading to what we will here call the problem of paralysis. Virtually every action 
carries with it some risk, however small, of serious harm to others, and so assigning 
individuals the right not to be subjected to risk, without their consent, is an impossible 
position. How, then do we determine which risks to allow, and, even more 
importantly from a philosophical point of view, on what grounds? 
  
2. Historical Background to the Ethics of Risk 
  
Although Teuber is correct to note that philosophers have given little attention to the 
ethics of risk, it would be wrong to suppose that philosophers have not been interested 
in questions of risk. Indeed, the idea of the steps needed to obtain security is at the 
centre of Hobbes’s political philosophy (Hobbes, 1660/1996), while the notion of 
moral luck is much discussed in moral philosophy. (Nagel 1976, Williams 1976, 
Nussbaum 1986). Furthermore, technical questions concerning the nature of 
probability have been fundamental to epistemology and the philosophy of science at 
least since the writings of Hume (Hume 1739-40/2000). Nevertheless, there has been 
little systematic discussion of the ethics of risk: when it is morally acceptable for one 
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party to impose a new risk on another, or to permit the continuance of an avoidable 
situation which imposes risks. 
 
More broadly, the study of risk under the name of ‘risk’ is a fairly recent development 
evolving from two distinct disciplines: natural hazard studies, where geographers 
became interested in social response to natural hazards, and technological safety 
analysis which focuses on risks created by new human activities (Otway and Thomas 
1982: 70f). 
  
While risk has always been part of the human situation, our ability both to impose 
risks on each other, and, potentially, to mitigate those risks, has grown exponentially 
with scientific and technological development. In pre-modern society human beings 
faced a wide variety of hazards – ‘dangers’, as the anthropologist Mary Douglas puts 
it (Douglas 1992) – both natural, from disease and environment, and man-made, 
through deliberate human actions including war and assault. Yet risk as a side-effect 
of deliberate human action, and the ability to take effective steps to mitigate such 
risks, was much rarer in pre-industrial society.  
  
For this reason sociologist Ulrich Beck has suggested that we now live in a ‘Risk 
Society’. ‘Anyone who set out to discover new countries and continents – like 
Columbus – certainly accepted “risks” But these were personal risks, not global 
dangers like those that arise for all of humanity from nuclear fission or the storage of 
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radioactive waste. In the earlier period, the word ‘risk’ had a note of bravery and 
adventure, not the threat of self-destruction of all life on Earth.’ (Beck 1986/1992: 21, 
see also Giddens 1990). 
  
Beck advances a number of claims. First, risk is now considered largely negative. 
Second, many risks are created by human action. Third, many are global in scale and 
cannot be contained. Fourth, many are imperceptible, such as radiation, or invisible 
gasses, and we must rely on expert judgement even to come to believe that we are at 
risk.  
  
Risk management and moral philosophy inevitably plays ‘catch-up’ with the 
development of technology. Laws regulating the industrial workplace date back, in 
the UK, to the early 1800s. An early attempt to regulate transport safety in the UK, for 
example, was the ‘Locomotive Act’ of 1861, also known as the ‘red flag’ act. Such 
regulations were initially based on intuitive judgements of what was reasonable, 
rather than on any explicit analysis. However, over time, forms of cost-benefit 
analysis have been introduced into analysis and regulation, in which both the potential 
benefit of regulation and its costs are calculated in order to inform decisions about 
stringency of regulation. 
 
As if by the backdoor, therefore, risk management has implicitly adopted a 
consequentialist framework. Such practices, however, in turn throw up both 
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philosophical and technical questions. Is it right to adopt a consequentialist 
framework, and, if there is doubt, is there a morally superior alternative that could be 
used to inform policy? (Hansson 1993, Hansson 2007a). How, exactly, are the 
different outcomes to be measured, and how should probabilities be taken into 
account? Arguably both sets of problems became urgent with the discovery of nuclear 
power, the introduction of the first commercial nuclear power stations in the 1950s, 
and renewed interest in alternative energy sources after the oil crisis of the 1970s, 
together with an appreciation of the hidden environmental and human costs of new 
technology (Carson 1962/2000). 
 
However, even if issues of risk came to prominence in the context of exotic new 
technologies, much government action concerns questions of how to deal with the 
ordinary hazards of everyday life: illness; unemployment; dangerous goods and 
services and so on. Public spending decisions will often be, in effect, be decisions to 
redistribute exposure to risk, either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore the ethics of risk 
is at the centre of our lives, and it is surprising that its discussion has not been more 
prominent.  
3. Risk in Contemporary Philosophy and Social Science 
While sociologists, anthropologists, economists, lawyers and psychologists have 
grappled with questions of risk for decades, moral philosophy has been relatively late 
to the debate. One of the first substantial discussions appears in Nozick’s Anarchy, 
State and Utopia, in 1974, where, to Nozick’s credit, he appreciates the difficulties for 
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a rights-based theory in deriving a satisfactory approach to risk. Nozick’s discussion 
still remains relevant, and we will return to it below (Nozick 1974). 
Among the most significant and enduring contributions are two volumes published in 
collaboration with the Centre for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of 
Maryland, College Park. To Breathe Freely, edited by Mary Gibson (Gibson 1985) 
and Values at Risk, edited by Douglas MacLean (MacLean 1986), were funded by the 
US National Science Foundation’s program on Technology Assessment and Risk 
Analysis, and contain papers by an impressive group of philosophers, including 
Samuel Scheffler, Peter Railton, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Annette Baier, Alan Gibbard, 
Ian Hacking and Amartya Sen, as well as leading social scientists.  
It is striking, however, that having contributed to these volumes, few of the 
philosophers involved published more widely on risk (Judith Thomson being the main 
exception, see Thomson 1986). Indeed the research programme on the ethics of risk in 
moral philosophy did not take hold to any great extent as a topic in its own right, 
unlike the topic of risk in decision theory which has flourished as an important sub-
discipline within philosophy. However, many of the issues of the ethics of risk have 
been explored in the context of environmental philosophy (such as Shrader-Frechette 
2002) and philosophy of science and technology (Shrader-Frechette 1980, 1985, 
1991), or on the borders of law and philosophy (for example Perry 1995, 2001, 
Sunstein 2002, 2005, and Cranor 1997). The most significant current research group 
on the ethics of risk is probably that led by Sven Ove Hansson, at the Royal Institute 
of Technology in Sweden, who are significantly represented in a recent collection 
Risk: Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Tim Lewens, (Lewens 2007) and also in a 
Danish-Swedish volume on philosophy and risk Risk & Risici (Persson and Sahlins 
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2008). The most recent contribution to the ethics of risk is a volume on technological 
risk edited by Sabine Roeser and Lotte Asvald (Roeser and Asvalt 2009).  
  
4. The Definition of Risk 
  
Question of the ethics of risk must start at least with the question of what do we mean 
by ‘risk’. The problem is that there is no unified agreement about the concept, but 
several different meanings are in use. 
On a general everyday level ‘risk’ simply refers to the possibility or likelihood of a 
possible negative outcome, such as a loss, injury, harm, or death. The concept of risk 
thus entails both a negative effect and an acknowledged possibility of it coming 
about. In contrast to this everyday concept there is the statistical or technical concept 
of ‘risk’ that is numerical: a risk is then the numerical value of the effect (its cost) and 
the estimated numerical probability that it will occur. The shift is here from a general 
uncertainty to what will happen to an uncertainty of a more precise kind – we do not 
know what will happen, but have an estimate of how probable the different possible 
outcomes are, and thus have an idea of how probable the unwanted outcome is. 
The everyday concept of risk shifts between referring to an activity or action that is 
potentially dangerous (i.e. the source of the risk), the actual negative outcome that 
may occur (i.e. the possible harm), and the degree of probability or likelihood of it 
happening. Hansson has identified no less than five different usages of the notion of 
‘risk’: 
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1. An unwanted event which may or may not occur. 
2. The cause of an unwanted event which may or may not occur. 
3. The probability of an unwanted event which may or may not occur. 
4. The statistical expected value of unwantedevents which may or may not occur. 
5. The fact that a decision is made under conditions of known probabilities [for 
different possible outcomes that may occur] (Hansson 2004a: 10, italics added). 
  
In general, however, it would seem that little turns on how ‘risk’ is understood, with 
the important exception of a distinction between decisions under risk, with known 
probabilities for different outcomes, and uncertainty, where the possible outcomes are 
known, but their probabilities are not. Decisions under uncertainty create particular 
difficulties for decision theory as calculations of expected utility cannot be made. The 
ethics of risk in moral philosophy however generally covers both (see e.g. Altham 
1983-4: 15). In cases where the sources of risk is a new one the state of ignorance 
could be even greater: we may know that at least one possible outcome is harmful, but 
lack knowledge about whether there are other harmful outcomes not yet taken into 
consideration. We can also add cases where we have merely partial or very limited 
knowledge not only of probabilities but also about the range of possible outcomes of a 
particular activity (Sahlin and Persson 1994). It has plausibly been suggested that 
most real life decisions involve some level of radical uncertainty (Hansson 2009), 
which raises the question of the applicability of decision-theoretical models to real 
life.  
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In the sociological literature there is a tendency towards scepticism about the 
existence of ‘risks’ suggesting that they are ‘socially constructed’ rather than 
objective facts (Beck 1986/1992). But, clearly, expected and predictable harms exist 
as well as actions that may bring about such harms. The psychological literature, 
naturally enough, is especially interested in question of risk perception, and how 
factors such as novelty and familiarity lead to risk perception that may differ wildly 
from scientific analysis (Slovic et al 1982, Slovic 1999). We will look at this in more 
detail in the next section. 
A different issue concerns how to individuate risks, and whether we should be 
concerned with the question of whether what is of concern is a type of risky action, 
such as the emission of a particular chemical pollutant, or whether we should be 
concerned with the total level of risk individuals are subject to. A person may be put 
at a trivial level of risk from a number of different sources, but, put together, total 
exposure reaches problematic levels, as, for example, in environmental risk It seems 
reasonable to be concerned both about types of risky activities and total risk exposure, 
although in philosophy the tendency has been to discuss the moral acceptability of the 
risk of particular kinds of activities, rather than total exposure.  
 
5. What is So Bad about Being Subject to Risk? 
It is not difficult to understand why it is problematic to impose harms on others. Yet 
there is something more troubling about the question of what is so bad about being 
subject to risk. Of course, if the unwanted event happens then harm will occur. But if 
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it does not, then, it appears, no harm has been done. Our question, then, could 
possibly be put as ‘when is hypothetical harm a form of harm’?  
Believing that one is at risk can, however, clearly be detrimental to well-being. First, 
a person may fear, or be anxious, about the risk. Second, they may feel that they need 
to take costly or difficult precautions to reduce the probability of the hazard 
occurring. Third, the hazard may have further negative effects, and so they may feel 
that they need to take steps, again, which may be costly or difficult, to minimize the 
spread of the hazard. Believing oneself to be at risk, therefore, can be highly 
damaging in a number of identifiable ways. (For further discussion see Wolff and de-
Shalit 2007). Gauthier makes a more general point that one may take pleasure or 
displeasure in being subject to chance (Gauthier 1986: 43). However, if the person 
subject to the risk does not have knowledge of the risk, are they harmed in any way?  
Stephen Perry has argued that imposing a risk is not, in itself to impose a harm. (Perry 
2007) Perry’s argument starts from the relative frequency theory of probability, which 
is commonly assumed in discussions of risk. We will discuss this in more detail 
below. According to the frequency theory to know what risk I face I need to know my 
reference class. Consider, for example, one’s risk of developing a certain disease. 
Suppose it is known how frequently this disease strikes members of the population. 
However, it may be different for males and females, and further segmented for social 
class, genetic endowment, environment and behaviour. Each of these can be divided 
further. The question then arises of which is the ‘correct’ reference class for me. 
There seems no obvious answer. If it is thought, plausibly, that the most specific 
reference class is the correct one, then this leaves me in a reference class of one 
person – myself.  And as Perry also points out, in a deterministic universe then I will 
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either get the disease or not, and hence all (objective) risk is eliminated, leaving only 
degrees of belief about risk. (Perry 2007: 196) 
This is a very interesting argument, although what it shows is less clear. Perry has 
shown that on a frequency theory of probability there appears to be no non-arbitrary 
way of quantifying risk, which is a very important result. However why this also 
shows that subjecting someone to risk is not to harm them is not obvious. Perry 
himself accepts that ‘subjecting B to a risk sets back an interest of B’ (Perry 
2007:193) but claims that setting back an interest is not sufficient for harm. (Although 
interestingly Mill’s Harm Principle has been interpreted in terms of interests being set 
back). Perry also accepts that there can be reasons for attempting to prevent one party 
from imposing a risk on another.  From the point of view of the ethics of risk this is 
the important point, whether or not imposing risk is considered a form of harm. 
Regardless of whether the mere risk of harm is a harm in itself or not, we may think 
that the distribution of risks and benefits are important. Even if a particular risk never 
materializes into harm, it would seem unfair if such risks are systematically imposed 
on those who do not have a share in the benefits resulting from such risks. Yet if 
everyone who did not have a share in the benefits of a particular risky activity had the 
right to moral veto that activity, the problem of paralysis returns.  
The ethical worry is clearly put in the title of the influential paper: ‘How Safe is Safe 
Enough?’ (Fischhoff et al 1978). The classical problem of risk within risk 
management and risk was framed in terms of ‘tolerable risk’ and ‘acceptable risk’, 
assuming that the level of risk that was already accepted could be used as a 
benchmark for new risks (see e.g. Otway and von Winterfeldt 1982). The field of risk 
perception studies sprung up as a study of general acceptance and response to 
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different kinds of risks. The classical paper here is that of Chauncey Starr published in 
Science in 1969: with the revealing subtitle: ‘what is our society willing to pay for 
safety?’ (Starr 1969) Fischhoff and colleagues subsequently argued against the idea of 
a universal quantitative measure of an acceptable level of risk (Fischhoff et al 1981). 
Later risk perception research came to focus on explaining public attitudes to different 
kinds risk, rather than trying to map public preferences for a particular level of risk 
that could be applied to all sources of risk. Public attitudes to different sources of 
risks did not match the probability for death for each of those risks, so other factors 
explaining this otherwise seeming irrationality was proposed. The anthropologists 
Mary Douglas and Adam Wildavsky suggested four archetypical attitudes to risk in 
their initially influential Culture Theory (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, see also 
Thompson, 1986 and Adams 1995). Paul Slovic and others instead proposed what 
later became the dominant ‘psychometric’ framework, taking a statistical quantitative 
approach to explain public attitudes through large surveys. Here ethical considerations 
seem to influence public perception of acceptability: the degree to which the risk is 
controllable; how well-known it is (to science); the novelty of the risk; how equitable 
the imposition of risk is; how voluntary; and the severity of consequences, such as 
irreversible consequences, consequences with global catastrophic impact, and risks 
affecting future generations (see e.g. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982). 
The public view can be summarized in the following terms. Some risky actions have 
such undesirable features that they should be be impermissible. Some are perceived of 
as of such low risk that they can be permitted without further concern. Between these 
is a range of potentially problematic cases, but numerous factors, and not just the 





Although any attempt to classify theories into types may be an over-simplification, 
nevertheless it is possible to pick out a number of central approaches to the ethics of 
risk. Of course, each has variants, and any particular philosopher may draw on more 
than one source, but it is still useful to attempt to distinguish a number of different 
strategies. The first we shall look at is consequentialism, which, as we noted,has in 
effect become the default approach to the regulation of risk in public policy (see 
Hansson 1993 and 2007a for critical discussion). 
The general idea within at least one main strand of consequentialism is that the moral 
evaluation of an action is solely determined by its outcome. Thus the actual outcome 
of an action is what makes it right or wrong compared to all actions available at the 
time. Whichever action causes the greater good over all other actions is permissible. 
However, since the actual outcome cannot be known at the time of deliberation about 
what to do, focus within consequentialism concerning permissibility and 
blameworthiness must shift to expected outcomes, in the sense of the range of 
possible outcomes and their probabilities, in order to guide action (Hansson 2003). 
Calculating the expected outcomes of different options has its obvious application to 
the context of risks, and various approaches in similar vein are common in formal 
decision theory and economics, as well as applied in policy making and risk 
management. In such an approach we need not know the actual outcome to determine 
what to do but merely how bad and how likely the harm will be, and compare this 
expected risk with its expected benefits and costs and against other alternatives. A 
risk cost-benefit analysis is conducted, and, in starkest form, a risk, or risky practice, 
 14 
will be permitted if and only if its expected benefits exceed its expected costs, and 
provides the greatest sum of benefits compared to alternative options (Leonard and 
Zeckhauser, 1986, for critical discussion see e.g. Hansson 1993, 2003, 2004b, and 
2007).  
Like all forms of consequentialism, risk cost-benefit analysis appears vulnerable to 
worries about the distribution of costs and benefits. In practice it is likely that the 
greatest risks would fall on those least able to influence the decision procedure or 
protect themselves in other ways. Hence there is a worry that risk cost-benefit 
analysis will pile up risks for the vulnerable while the benefits accrue elsewhere. It is, 
however, possible, as Leonard and Zeckhauser note, to modify consequentialist so 
that more weight is given to costs and benefits that accrue to the badly off, thereby 
deriving some form of risk ‘prioritarianism’. It is also possible to go even further and 
say that some risks are too severe to allow, unless there are special circumstances, 
whatever the benefits. (See the UK regulatory guidance HSE 2001: 51 for the 
example of banning lead glazes in pottery for such reasons).  
Risk cost-benefit analysis, as a form of consequentialism, would appear most 
naturally to be justified in terms of arguments in favour of maximizing the good. It is 
interesting, however, that at least within economic theory its main justification is not a 
direct argument from maximizing the good, but from dealing with market failure. In 
an approach arguably deriving from the economist Thomas Schelling (Schelling 
1968/1984), Leonard and Zeckhauser explain: 
Since many important risks cannot be exchanged on a voluntary basis, it is 
essential to have a centralized decision process that will regulate or determine 
their levels. In choosing among alternative projects that create different levels 
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of risk, the government (or other responsible decision-makers) should seek the 
outcomes that fully informed individuals would choose for themselves if 
voluntary exchange were feasible. Risks are not different in principle from 
other commodities, such as park services, public transit, or housing. (Leonard 
and Zeckhauser 1986: 33) 
Sunstein, attempting to avoid foundational questions, argues that cost-benefit 
analysis, it is simply the most rational tool for making decision on a governmental 
level and that any other method would lead to less desirable results.  ‘For the moment, 
let us understand cost-benefit analysis to entail a full accounting of the consequences 
of risk reduction, in both quantitative and qualitative terms.’ (Sunstein 2002) His 
argument stems from the shortcomings in public risk perception and the difficulties in 
understanding probabilities that Tversky and Kahneman’s very influential work has 
suggested (see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1981). He writes:  
The goal is to overcome cognitive limitations by ensuring that people have 
full, rather than limited, sense of what is at stake. People often miss the 
systemic effects of risk regulation; cost-benefit analysis is a way of putting 
those effects squarely on-screen. …[and] overcome problems with availability 
heuristic… (Sunstein 2002: 107) 
It is clear from these remarks that defenders of the consequentialist approach consider 
the topic from the point of view of government action or policy-making. This is not, 
therefore, intended as a direct contribution to the moral question of how one 
individual should act with respect to imposing risks on others. It does not seem that 
one individual has a right to impose uncompensated risks on one party for the sake of 
greater benefits to another, unless doing so follows from existing regulation, as in the 
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case of driving, or of workplace safety. There is no suggestion, for example, that an 
ordinary citizen should carry out a cost-benefit analysis before acting. Rather the 
citizen’s duty, on such a view, is to obey the laws and regulations, which should be 
based, according to the theory, on the deliberations of cost-benefit analysis.  
To return to the criticisms of the theory, even if consequentialism is modified to be 
more sensitive to distributional issues, there are, nevertheless, a number of difficulties 
it must confront. The process of applying consequentialism requires a certain type of 
calculation, which in turn requires a good deal of information. Independently of the 
question of the moral justification of the method, we must ask whether the 
information it requires exists or is available. (See e.g. Hansson 2007a, Fischhoff et al 
1981).The issues we raise are not all uniquely problems for consequentialism. 
However consequentialism does bring them into sharp focus. 
I) Establishing causal correlation between action and possible harm. 
  
The first question will always have to be whether there is reason to believe that the 
action or program under consideration does raise the chance of an adverse effect.  
Some cases are fairly straightforward such as traffic and road accidents, or an 
explosion in a factory employing dangerous materials, or other kinds of fairly 
immediate harm. In other cases it is less clear whether there is a hazard at all, as when 
there is a statistical correlation between a possible source of harm and harm in a large 
data set, with many possible inter-acting or counter-acting components, such as in 
cases of leukemia clusters, or carbon emissions. In such cases we need a scientific 
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theory to link action to consequences, and, of course, such scientific claims may be 
controversial.  
To what extent should a decision about risk, based upon a weighing of benefits and 
risks, take into account not yet established but merely possible risks for harm? How 
should we treat activities that are only potentially harmful when interacting with other 
sources of harm? We will return to this when discussing the ‘precautionary principle’ 
below. 
II) Assessing the probability for harm. 
Ultimately the issue of probability is fundamental for assessing risks. Within formal 
cost-benefit analysis it seems necessary not only to identify some increased possibility 
of some adverse effect, but to be able to give a reasonably precise estimate of that 
increase, both for the contemplated course of action and for its alternatives. For 
otherwise it would simply be impossible to know which course of action gives the 
greatest net expected benefits (Hansson 1993: 2009).  
However, as we have already seen in the discussion of Perry’s argument above, the 
notion of probability is not unproblematic. After all, any action or event either will, or 
will not, in fact cause an adverse consequence. How then, should we understand the 
idea that an event increases the probability of another event? It appears that there is no 
metaphysical property of actions themselves that are of the kind ‘to cause a 0.1 
probability of death’. Actions are not metaphysical entities that have perfectly 
calibrated roulette guns attached to them that, with mathematical precision, will 
release, or shoot off, a certain effect at a fixed percentage of the times it is performed.  
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In some areas it is in principle possible to apply a frequency theory of probability, for 
there are large data sets with fairly stable frequencies, in such areas as transport 
safety, although we must acknowledge the ‘problem of the reference class’ identified 
above. In other areas, such as nuclear power, it appears that there is a potential for a 
particular type of catastrophic event which in its precise details has happened perhaps 
only once (e.g. Chernobyl, or the very different circumstances at Fukushima). For 
other types no such incident has occurred, but it would be quite wrong to conclude 
that their probability is zero. To try to estimate probabilities it is sometimes possible 
to undertake a ‘critical factor’ analysis, looking at the probability of failure of critical 
components and the probability of several failing at once to create a disastrous result. 
For some factors frequency data may exist, but for others not, and estimates for new 
technology may be over-optimistic, so we return to the same problem. And we can 
never be sure that we have identified all the possible sources of failure (Shrader-
Frechette 1990 for a similar point, and see also Chs 5, 6 in Shrader-Frechette 1985a 
and 1980: 83ff for discussion about estimating probabilities in risk assessments). In 
the end, analysts will depend on estimates based on theory and judgement which may 
have a confidence interval of orders of magnitude. In such circumstances, cost-benefit 
analysis, or indeed any form of quantified risk assessment, is highly problematic as it 
will rest on risk assessments that can be highly contentious. 
  
III) Valuing risk/life  
Perhaps even more problematic than the estimation of probabilities is the numerical 
evaluation of magnitude of the possible adverse outcome, or as this amounts to in 
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most cases, deciding how much money should be spent to save a life, however cold 
and inhumane this may seem.  
In order to make such a programme appear less objectionable it is often pointed out 
that, first, in risk cost-benefit the cost is not actual death, but small risks of deaths 
spread out over many people (Schelling 1968/1984), and, second, in real life we are 
prepared to increase our risk of death for the sake even of the trivial benefit of 
crossing a road a few seconds before the signal indicates it is safer to do so. Equally, 
we are prepared to pay money to increase our safety, in buying smoke alarms, better 
quality products, and so on. Hence paying to reduce risk, or trading risk for 
convenience, is a perfectly ordinary part of life. It is this observation that lies behind 
Leonard and Zeckhauser’s suggestion above that risk management should seek to 
mimic the market as far as possible (Leonard and Zeckhauser 1986). In the UK at the 
present time regulations suggest that if a safety modification would save a ‘statistical 
life’ (i.e. one fewer death can be expected) at a cost of less than about £1.3m then 
there is a statutory duty to introduce it. (For further discussion see Wolff 2006, 2007, 
Hansson 2007b). 
One issue that immediately arises is how to put a financial value on risks to life and 
health. To pursue that in detail is beyond the scope of the present paper, but in brief, 
common methods base valuations on what individuals are prepared to pay to reduce 
small risks (willingness to pay – WTP), or the compensation they need to run them 
(willingness to accept compensation – WTA), either as revealed in their market 
behaviour (revealed preferences) or through hypothetical scenarios revealed in 
laboratory conditions. None of this, of course, is entirely straightforward (Jones-Lee 
et al 1985) and as even advocates of such approaches have pointed out, it is possible 
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to get a very wide range of values from studies, and hence the robustness of any 
particular figure is highly questionable, even if, as may not be the case, the general 
method is accepted (Beattie et al 1998, Wolff and Orr 2009). 
In sum, then, consequentialist approaches to risk face two types of difficulties. First, 
there are philosophical doubts about the ethics of maximization given concerns about 
fair distribution of risk. Second there are a range of technical and philosophical 
questions about the derivation of the various numbers that need to be used in making 
the analysis of expected costs and benefits. This problem is amplified by Hansson’s 
claim that in practice we generally face questions of uncertainty rather than risk, and 
in such cases cost-benefit analysis appears little help (Hansson 2009). 
7. Deontological Approaches to Risk 
  
In other moral contexts, rights based theory is often proposed as an alternative to 
consequentialism in order to avoid the problem of ‘permitted unfairness’. It is 
tempting to try to apply similar reasoning to the ethics of risk. Deontology is also far 
less subject to the problem that precise numbers are needed in order to select between 
options. The challenge, however, is that it seems impossible to argue that there is an 
absolute right not to be subject to any risk to which one has not consented, for this 
would seem to rule out virtually all action: what we called the problem of paralysis 
(see e.g. Teuber 1990, Hansson 2003b, McCarthy 1997 for similar points). 
Consequently it seems necessary to make a distinction between ‘rights-violating’ risk 
imposition and ‘non-rights-violating’ risk imposition.  
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One way of approaching this issue is via means of compensation. Perhaps the 
problem of paralysis can be overcome is by compensating those whose rights are 
violated (Nozick 1974: 54-86). In one way, however, this is a curious suggestion. 
Often the function of compensation is primarily restorative, and partly succeeds in 
this by being a material acknowledgement of harm done, and a type of commitment 
not to continue the same course of action: a commitment that is impossible where 
compensation is paid for risk imposition (see Hayenhjelm, forthcoming).   
Nevertheless, compensation has been central to the rights approach to risk. Robert 
Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, recognizes the difficulties natural rights 
theories face in accounting for our common-sense practices regarding risk, which, for 
example, allow driving of cars, despite the clear risks it imposes to third parties, but 
does not allow individuals to play Russian Roulette on unwilling strangers, however 
large the number of chambers on the gun. Nozick frames his discussion by posing two 
questions: first, why not permit all risky action, provided victims are compensated for 
any (unjustified) harms suffered; and second, why not prohibit all risky behaviour? 
(Nozick 1974: 65). In implicit recognition of the problem of paralysis Nozick does 
not treat the second as a serious question. Rather, the question is why not allow ‘act 
first, compensate later, if necessary’ in all cases. (See Railton 1985 for critical 
discussion).  
  
For some harms, such as death, no compensation is possible, and such cases will 
continue to be problematic (Nozick 1974: 66). However, Nozick points out that even 
when someone can be fully compensated for a smaller loss, they may still fear the 
event in prospect. As he points out one can still fear, say, having one’s arm broken 
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even if one knows that lavish compensation will follow. But, even worse, if we live in 
a society where we know others can harm us provided they pay compensation later, 
then we might all live in what Nozick calls ‘free-floating’ fear. Not all those who live 
in fear will ultimately be harmed, and therefore if compensation is to be paid only for 
harm, then non-victims who live in fear will never receive compensation. Hence, it 
appears, compensation should be ‘ex ante’: all those who are exposed should be 
compensated. But this would generate insuperable practical difficulties. Therefore 
there is also good reason to prohibit actions that will cause free floating fear, and 
these are likely to include acts of violence (Nozick 1974: 66-69). 
  
Although Nozick is able to present cases where prohibition should be the right policy 
even if compensation is possible, the natural rights approach is still in difficulty in 
dealing with risks of death. In particular it seems to be in difficulties in distinguishing 
cases such as driving, where risks of death to third parties are considered permissible, 
and the Russian roulette cases, where this is not so. Indeed, it seems hard to make 
such a distinction without bringing in a further aspect: the benefit of the activity, and 
therefore the (opportunity) cost of banning it. Such issues are more easily 
accommodated in a consequentialist framework, or, perhaps, a contractualist 
framework, which Nozick himself hints at, and we will explore shortly. It does not 
follow that one ought to give up the notion of individual natural rights as the basis of 
morality and adopt utilitarianism. But the difficulties in dealing with risk suggest that 
a plausible morality will involve at base more than a scheme of pre-social, territorial 
individual rights and will make room for a number of notions – balancing, 
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aggregation, and the like – more commonly associated with utilitarian than natural-
rights theories (Railton 1985: 119, McCarthy 1997).  
8. Consent  
  
Compensation can also function as part of a more-or-less explicit agreement making 
an otherwise unattractive option more appealing (Railton 1985, Hayenhjelm, 
forthcoming). But then it is consent not compensation that makes the action 
permissible. On the face of it, if it can be shown that everyone who faces a risk of 
harm consents to that risk, then the moral problem of risk imposition disappears. 
However, consent is not so straightforward. Do workers who knowingly work in 
polluted factories consent to the risk of harm, or, at least, do so in a way that 
legitimates such a risk imposition? This was a major concern of the Mary Gibson 
edited volume To Breathe Freely (Gibson 1985). One particular puzzle was identified 
by Judith Jarvis Thomson, in her example of ‘Unpleasant Way’: 
  
Suppose there are two ways in which I can get home from the station at the 
end of the day. The first is pleasant, passes through a brightly lit middle-class 
shopping area, is quite safe, but is long. The second way is unpleasant, passes 
through an ill-lit area of warehouses, is unsafe, but is short. Nobody has ever 
been mugged while walking along Pleasant Way; people have from time to 
time been mugged on Unpleasant Way. Here I am at the station; I’m tired; I 
think ‘The Hell, I’ll chance it, I’ll take Unpleasant Way.’ I then promptly get 
mugged. (Thomson 1985: 139) 
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Thomson plausibly argues that although she knowingly ran the risk of being mugged, 
and therefore should not be surprised that it happened, nevertheless she has still been 
wronged. The fact that she consented to walk down Unpleasant Way, and knew that a 
mugging was a practical possibility, is not enough to make it the case that she has 
consented to the mugging. On the other hand, if one consents to a gamble, and loses, 
one doesn’t consent to the loss, but nevertheless often the loser has no legitimate 
complaint. Thomson does not attempt to show why and when it is that consent also 
renders foreseen consequences fair, and it still remains, as Thomson says ‘a nice 
problem’ (Thomson 1985: 139). What it shows, however, is that it is not always easy 
to decide what someone has consented to, and if they have consented, what their 
consent entails, and this applies with particular force to those who work in what they 
know to be hazardous jobs.  
  
In what may, at first, appear to be a further complication of the issue of consent, 
Samuel Scheffler provides an illuminating distinction between three reasons for 
taking consent seriously. The first is purely instrumental. Insisting on consent is likely 
to provide a barrier to morally unacceptable outcomes, and will improve inter-
personal relations, as, for example, in medical ethics (see e.g. Manson and O’Neill 
2007). Second, consent may be thought to be an important aspect of a good life. The 
mere fact of being able to make choices is important, independently of the results 
achieved. Third, it might be argued that we have strong individual rights that bar 
others doing anything to us without our consent. (Scheffler 1985: 75-6) 
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Although these arguments are often used together, perhaps even run together, they are 
importantly distinct. Only on the third view is it automatically wrong to do things to 
people without their consent. The first two views accept that consent is very 
important, yet make room for the possibility that consent is not always necessary to 
legitimize action. By contrast, on the third view it is of paramount importance, 
perhaps the only thing of importance. This view is associated, of course, with natural 
rights or libertarian writing. But we remain with the main problem. Unless we are 
prepared to accept the problem of paralysis, we cannot accept the claim that actual 
consent is a necessary condition of legitimate risk imposition. 
9. Contractualism 
Contractualism may appear to retain many of the attractions of the actual consent 
approach, yet avoid many of the difficulties. On this approach risk impositions are 
morally permissible if and only if they are such that everyone concerned could or 
would, at least in theory, agree to them, or to principles regulating them, from a 
suitable defined standpoint. This would exclude morally unattractive utilitarian or 
consequentialist cases of asymmetric imposition of risks to one person for the benefit 
of another since this is, presumably, is not something everyone would agree to. We 
might say, in this case, one’s compensation for being exposed to risk is the 
opportunity to expose others, and indeed, this appears to be the view that Nozick 
leans towards (Nozick 1974: 66-67). 
Lenman turns to contractualism precisely to avoid the unfairness associated with pure 
aggregation where the risks to one person can be outweighed by the benefits to the 
many. The contractarian approach that he takes as his starting point, based on 
Scanlon, is characterised by ‘…the thought that the right normative ethical claims are 
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those we are best able to justify to others where, crucially, this justifiability is 
understood as justifiability to each other person…’ (Lenman 2008: 100) The voice of 
every single person exposed to a risk matters, and cannot be overlooked by the 
number of people benefiting from so exposing that person. This means that we avoid 
the simple version of the problem of paralysis; it is not an absolute restriction against 
harm that marks the line of permissibility. We can impose risks on others as long as 
this is done in a way that is justifiable to each, involving an equitable distribution of 
risk. 
Contractualism thus provides a plausible moral standpoint when people equally 
benefit, at least ex ante, from mutual imposition of risk. However, matters are more 
troublesome when some will benefit much more than others. Whereas some such 
cases are obviously morally problematic such as painful medical experiments on 
selected victims, other cases we seem to accept rather un-problematically such as the 
risks to those on the ground of planes falling falling from the sky (Scanlon 2000: 
209). But how is the contractualist to account for the intuition that the risk from 
falling planes does not make air traffic impermissible? Munoz-Dardé addresses this 
question, developing the example into a case of an Amish farmer running a very small 
risk of becoming a victim of falling planes due to air traffic, an activity from which he 
gains no or little benefit (Munoz-Dardé, forthcoming). The case is problematic for 
Scanlon as he neither allows for interpersonal aggregation nor the degree of 
probability of harm to determine the moral permissibility of risk impositions.
1
 
                                                 
1 He does allow for numbers to be taken into account but merely as a “tie-breaker” 
between equal moral claims. (Scanlon 2000: 232f). For discussion on Scanlon and the 
problem of aggregation see Scanlon 2000: 229ff, Ashford 2003, Otsuka 2006, 
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 As soon as aggregation and probability adjustments are introduced it can be hard to 
resist accepting the imposition of risk on some for the benefit of others. Scanlon tries 
to step around this problem by making risk impositions conditional on due precaution 
on the one hand and the degree of burden such precautionary restrictions would entail. 
However, if the concern of the farmer is to be counted for the same as that of 
everyone else, then we may have evaded the problem of paralysis by replacing it with 
one of equally valid conflicting moral claims. (Scanlon 2000: 235-237).  
Altham in a much earlier discussion notes the difficulties of applying contractarianism 
to the ethics of risk. His worry is how the interests of the risk averse and the risk 
prone could ever meet in some general principle that seems rational in a Rawlsian 
original position. There seems to be little hope for convergence. (Altham 1983: 22). 
  
Hansson suggests that a risk imposed on an individual should be linked to an 
‘equitable social system of risk-taking that works to her advantage’ (Hansson 2003b: 
305, and Hansson 2004: 32), that is to say a system of risk taking from which 
everyone benefits. But a scheme that made you face the risks of mining, me the risks 
of infectious diseases in being a doctor, and another the risks from a waste dump, may 
neither be efficient nor fair, since this may not take special vulnerabilities, interests or 
concerns of individuals into account. It is possible, however, that the approach can be 
developed to deal with such problems, although we should also note that, this 
                                                                                                                                           
Reibetanz 1998 Low probability of harm is not a reason to discount for that harm but 
gives rise to precautionary obligations. (Scanlon 2000: 208f) 
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approach, in itself, says nothing about the acceptable level of risk that we may each 
face. 
Although not explicitly addressed to contractualism, it is worth introducing an 
important contribution introduced by Hermansson and Hansson (2007), who note that 
the imposition of risk generally involve three crucial roles: first, being exposed to the 
risk (and its possible harms); second, benefiting from the risk-imposing activity; and 
third having thedecision-making powers of decisions over that risk and the risk-
imposing activity.  They note that the ethics of risk look very different depending on 
how these roles are distributed. It is, for example, especially troubling if the party that 
benefits from the risk also has the decisive say as to whether it is imposed, while 
those who face the possible harms have no say (see also Wolff 2011). The promise of 
contractualism, perhaps, is to be able to rule out such situations unless they are part of 
a larger pattern from which everyone benefits. Nevertheless, applying contractualism 
to risk regulation policy has not been attempted in detail, and here it lags behind 
consequentialism. 
  
10. Prima Facie Rights  
An emerging compromise is to appeal to an individual’s prima facie right not to be 
subjected to risky activity, but in certain cases, such as when the benefits of the 
practice are generally high, and it meets other considerations perhaps about 
magnitude and distribution of risk, then risky behaviour is acceptable. Now, on a 
natural rights position such a view may appear entirely ad hoc, but if we return to 
Scheffler’s distinction between different reasons for valuing consent we can recall 
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that on some views consent is important not because we have natural rights, but either 
because consent normally indicates better moral outcomes, or because the opportunity 
to give and withhold consent is one component of the good life. On such views the 
prima facie right not to be subject to risky behaviour of others without consenting is a 
natural consequence of the rationale for finding consent important, as is the 
defeasibility of consent if there are other significant benefits. 
  
The question then arises of what follows if one’s prima facie rights are justifiably 
over-ridden, and one is subjected to risky behaviour. Note that on a pure 
consequentialist view compensation may not be necessary, for all consequences, 
including adverse ones, have already been taken into account in approving the risky 
behaviour in the first place. Thus compensation will only be required if, in advance, 
the possibility of compensation was one of the factors that led the action to be 
approved in the consequentialist calculation. On the prima facie rights view the 
situation is different, and compensation may be thought appropriate for over-riding a 
prima facie right, even if compensation would not be justified by a pure calculation of 
consequences. (see Peterson and Hansson 2004, Hansson 2007b) 
Indeed, we could see the doctrine of prima facie rights as an output of contractualism, 
as well as a plausible compromise between consequentialism and deontology. Hence 
there is much in its favour. However, there are two obvious limitations. First, the 
approach itself says nothing about the generally acceptable level of risk imposition. 
Second, while it seems reasonable in ordinary everyday cases, such as driving, 
ordinary workplace risks and so on, where everyone can benefit from practices of 
risk-taking, it is unclear that it can help with the cases such as new environmental 
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threats, climate change or nuclear power, that generated interest in the topic in the 
first instance. 
11. The Precautionary Principle 
In the case of more extreme or exotic risks, it is often assumed that there is a 
‘precautionary principle’ that can guide thinking. In fact what is called the 
precautionary principle is a response to an argument to the claim that where is no 
scientific proof of a harm, there should be no regulation. It is generally agreed that an 
early statement of the precautionary principle was provided in the United 
Nation’s Rio Declaration from 1992: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation 
(UNEP 1992). 
  
While wise advice, it is clear that this falls far short of any sort of principle. Some 
philosophers have taken the precautionary principle essentially as a way of framing 
the decision problem, emphasising the importance of scientists facing up to 
uncertainty, rather than as a contribution to decision theory (Steele 2006). Yet 
guidance is necessary in such cases.  
In the face of potentially catastrophic risks, such as nuclear accidents, it is tempting to 
suggest that the principle instructs us to take all possible precautions. But of course 
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one precaution is not building new power stations and returning to candle power (cf. 
Manson 2002). Accordingly, it seems appropriate to weaken the theory to ‘all 
reasonable’ or ‘all cost-effective’ precautions. Yet this threatens to reintroduce cost-
benefit analysis, or in other words only defers the problem. The very idea of 
precaution is very vague (see e.g. Sandin 2004 and Turner and Hartzell 2004). It 
appears that we lack any promising formal methodology for approaching extreme or 




Baier, in an early paper, takes a rather ‘anti-theoretical’ perspective on risk regulation 
from, starting from the Humean proposition that ‘Morality is the culturally acquired 
art of selecting which harms to notice and worry about, where the worry takes the 
form of bad conscience or resentment.’ (Baier 1986: 49)  
  
The idea is that in cases of risk we cannot rely on over-arching principles to reach the 
right kind of conclusions but must weigh all the reasons that bear on the case. Rights 
are nothing more than ‘crude moral guides.’ The main worry is that such rights will 
eventually clash and we need to be able to address such conflicts and determine which 
rights outweigh other ones.  
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Baier proposes a list of normative distinctions to take into account when making 
decisions about risk, suggesting that there are intuitive reasons that contribute to make 
a particular kind of risk impositions more or less morally problematic. Thus, it is 
better to exploit an old risk than adding a new one to old ones; it is better to allow 
risks taken in leisure time than as part of a work environment, etc. It is interesting to 
note the moral concerns that she raises are very similar to the explanations proposed 
in the study of public risk perception by Slovic and others (e.g. Slovic et al 1982) as 
mentioned in section 5 above, and indeed her whole approach has strong affinities 
with the anthropological approach (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, Douglas 1992, 
Thompson 1986, Adams 1999). Taken as intuitive moral indicators some of her 
normative distinctions have been widely discussed and some have lost some of their 
initial intuitive plausibility in later discussions. For example, it is not clear why a non-
natural risk is more morally problematic than a natural one (cf. Hansson 2003a, 
2007). Or, that risk imposed at work are morally more problematic than those in 
leisurely activities. Risks at work could well be compensated for and extra 
precautionary measures taken, and far from all risks faced outside the work place are 
voluntary. However, certain aspects from the risk perception literature do seem to 
hold a compelling intuitive force such as risks with large catastrophic effects, and 
risks with irreversible effects.  
  
Baier’s worry about basing an ethics of risks on over-arching principles such as 
rights, comes from the argument that rights presume identifiable victims and 
imposers, but also the possibility of delivering the requirements of those rights. 
However, what can be provided in terms of safety depends on contingent matters, 
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such as the political, social, educational structure in a given society that would enable 
provision of safety. The kinds of right to be rescued from risks cannot be conceived 
independently from institutions that can guarantee such rights.  
  
The genuine moral concern for Baier is that of acts out of ill-will towards others. Such 
moral wrong-doings seem to constitute a much more troubling kind than all others. 
Thus imposing risks onto others knowingly and intentionally can, according to her, be 
compared to sending poisoned chocolates to relatives slowly awaiting their death. As 
a consequence what is permissible and not permissible heavily depends upon what is 
known and what can be known about the effects of risky activities at a particular time. 
  
There are a number of objections that could be raised against making the 
permissibility of risks depend so much on intentional harm. It is not entirely clear 
what intentionally imposing a risk would entail and how that compares to intending 
bring about actual harm. Whereas it is morally problematic to intentionally harm 
someone, it is less obvious that the same moral intuition can be directly carried over 
to that of intentionally imposing a risk on someone, since presumably, at least in most 
cases, a risk is imposed for some expected gain that it may bring about. In the general 
case it makes no sense to presume that someone wanted to impose a risk out of ill-
will. A person may want to harm someone out of ill-will, but then why aim to merely 
for a risk rather than a more certain harm? There could be some particularly ill-willed 
cases when someone intends precisely not to bring about great harm but a greater 
harm by adding an element of fear as to which harm and when. In any case ruling 
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those cases out would still leave the bulk of all risk impositions. Another objection 
stems from the worry about making permissibility relative to information and 
knowledge. As Thomson puts it: 
  
We do not call out ’it is perfectly alright for you to press that button now, but we have 
some information that after we have given it to you it will then be the case that you 
ought not to press that button’ We do not suppose that what a man ought or ought not 
to do turn on what he thinks is the case. (Thomson 1986: 184) 
  
The rights and wrongs of risk impositions cannot depend entirely on what is known 
by the risk imposer. If that were the case a person could simply escape moral wrong 
doing by neglecting to inform himself or herself about potential risks and safety 
procedures. It seems that any knowledge-relativism must be complemented with some 
idea of what a risk imposer ought to have known, but again this is relative to such 
contingent matters as how much money is spent on which type of research, about 
duties to inform, rights to know, and dissemination of information. Whereas it may be 
excusable to impose a risk at a time when those risks are, universally, unknown, it 
cannot be excusable to merely fail to inform oneself of the risks resulting from actions 
affecting others.  
However, in fairness to Baier’s overall project, it is hard to deny that a strong strain of 
conventionalism must be part of risk ethics and regulation. Even within a 
contractualist theory of prima facie rights, a threshold between acceptable and 
unacceptable risks must be drawn, and it is hard to argue that there is a universal, 
 35 
cross-cultural answer to this question. At the very least, any cost-benefit analysis will 
depend on the valuation of different harms and benefits, and there is likely to be great 
variation here, which will, in return, be partly determined by level of wealth and 
resources. Wealthy societies will tolerate fewer risks than poorer ones, which have 
higher priorities for the use of their scarce resources. 
13. Proceduralism  
  
There is a worry about how much of all morally relevant features can be fitted into 
formal analysis, and how much must in the end be political decisions and open for a 
discussion amongst those concerned rather than decided by experts, especially in the 
cases of those risks that fall outside the ‘everyday’ category. 
There has, for at least the past three decades, been a persistent plea for democratic 
involvement of the public in decision-making about risk as an alternative to the 
expert-based cost benefit approach to risk decisions. Consequently many actual 
initiatives to involve the public in various ways have been introduced into the 
management of risks. However, the justification for this democratic involvement has 
been rather un-theoretical, stemming from an acknowledgement of the shortcomings 
of the scientific experts when it comes to values, rather than from anything more than 
cursory reference to the deliberative democracy literature within political philosophy.  
In particular, this call for democratic decision-making as a way to justify risk 
impositions is perhaps best understood against a type of scientific arrogance 
sometimes experienced in earlier days of risk governance. One central approach to the 
justificatory issues of technological risk impositions, as mentioned previously, was to 
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find the level of risk – a probability of expected deaths - that was ‘acceptable’ or 
‘tolerable.’ One such approach to find the level of risk was to compare with already 
existing ‘natural’ risks. Hence, the risks from nuclear power would be compared with 
the naturally occurring background radiation, for instance. A different approach 
would be to compare risks with those that are already accepted assuming that if a risk 
is de facto accepted it must also be acceptable. Or, as in Starr’s paper from 1969, 
accepted risks are compared against their benefits and costs (Starr 1969). Katherine 
Rowan distinguished between two different approaches to decisions about risk, one 
democratic and the other technocratic (Rowan 1994), and this dichotomy under 
different names seem to be the general view in most of the risk policy and risk 
communication literature (see e.g. Gurabardhi et al 2005). 
Against this line of thought came the ideas stemming from the empirical findings 
from risk perception research suggesting that people took many other concerns into 
account when ranking risks other than their magnitude, and that decisions about risks 
in the end were about values (cf. Otway and von Winterfeldt 1982). Slovic for 
example has argued (Slovic 1999) for a ‘lay expertise’ when it comes to values as an 
argument for participatory decision-making. It is in this line of thought that scholars 
like Jasanoff and Wynne argue for more public involvement together with an idea of 
the very understanding of ‘risk’ as socially constructed (see Kusch 2007 for 
discussion of Jasanoff and Wynne). This view, that since the understanding of risk is 
constructed it must be negotiated, is a re-occurring one in the sociological literature 
on risk. Bradbury expresses this view quite clearly: ‘From this viewpoint, acceptance 
and acceptability of risk cannot be analytically determined but must be negotiated, 
that is, socially constructed.’ (Bradbury 1989: 391). Beck, one of the key figures in 
the sociology of risk, expresses the social nature of risk thus:  
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By risks I mean above all radioactivity, which completely evades human 
perceptive abilities, but also toxins and pollutants in the air, the water and 
foodstuffs, together with the accompanying short- and long-term effects on plants, 
animals and people. They induce systematic and often irreversible harm, 
generally remain invisible, are based on causal interpretations, and thus only exist 
in terms of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them. They can be 
changed, magnified, dramatized or minimized within knowledge, and to that 
extent they are particularly open to social definition and construction. (Beck 
1992: 22f). 
  
It is revealing that Martin Kusch in an attempt to construct a political philosophy of 
risk discusses Jasanoff’s and Wynne’s empirical work in science and technology 
studies rather than political philosophy as representatives for this more democratic 




The philosophical area of ethics of risk falls somewhere between probability theory, 
decision theory, applied ethics, applied political philosophy, action theory, and moral 
philosophy, with obvious links to all of the above areas. Roughly, ethics of risk can be 
said to refer to two separate activities. It is in part ethics, decision theory, and 
epistemology, applied to cases of danger with the aim to inform the normative 
discussion on distinct issues and problems. But it is also in part a re-shaping of moral 
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philosophy to reconcile moral theory with circumstances of epistemic uncertainty and 
high stakes. It is rather telling how little the standard approaches to ethics seem able 
to satisfactory deal with the uncertainties of life and action, and how little has been 
done, even within philosophy, to draw separate disciplines together. For example, the 
current debates in action theory and moral philosophy about reasons and the formal 
and technical discussion about probabilities and uncertainty in epistemology have had 
remarkably little contact with each other and with the ethics of risk. ‘Risk’ as an 
integrated part of our understanding of moral actions would bring much of moral 
theory closer to the inherent complexity of moral issues. There are relevant 
discussions about uncertainty and risk in decision theory and epistemology but these 
stay within the realm of rational, rather than moral, actions. In moral and political 
philosophy there have been interesting debates about moral luck and lotteries, but 
such topics have typically been addressed in terms of reasons for exemptions from 
moral responsibility, or in any case as special cases rather than as an essential part of 
moral actions. 
  
The philosophical discussion of ethics of risks can be said to have focused primarily 
on five central problems. The first is that of the justification of imposing risks, often 
discussed with the example of hypothetical cases of Russian roulette with unusually 
many chambers. The second is the so-called problem of paralysis, resulting from 
moral impermissibility for imposing harm and imposing risk for harm leading to a 
paralysis of most actions. The third problem is that of a fair distribution of risks. If 
merely as low risk level as possible is sought this could lead to some being exposed to 
risks unfairly if this benefitted that total balance of risk exposure. Discussions on 
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public participation, equal distribution of risks, compensation for those who are more 
exposed, and deliberative approaches are all ways trying to address this particular 
problem. The fourth problem is that of assessing risks, or rather working out the right 
numerical estimate of a risk. Difficulties arise from the attempt to put a numerical 
value on risk, both from trying to put monetary value on such things as loss of life and 
limb, as well as problems in assigning probabilities for rare events. The fifth problem 
which we have not discussed in detail here concerns the scope of moral responsibility 
for risk impositions, in the face of problems with multiple or aggregate causes, 
knowledge and awareness of possible outcomes, proximity of causation, small risks 
distributed over large populations, anonymous deaths, collectively contributed risk 
impositions, and responsibility towards future generations and problems of 
discounting value for future gains and losses.  
  
Traditionally moral philosophy has not fully explored the complications that arise 
with the fact the most of the time when we act towards others we do not know what 
will happen. Consequentialism has traditionally looked at the actual outcomes of 
actions and deontological approaches at the intentions of the agent or the rights of 
individuals. Neither of these approaches provides much guidance when deciding how 
to act in cases of risky activities in pursuit of some good. Attempts have made to 
move consequentialism to expected outcomes, relying on assessments of probabilities 
and expected utility of outcomes compared against costs and benefits of different 
alternatives. This has probably been the more successful attempt to deal with the 
ethics of risks, at least in applications to policy, but leaves a lot unanswered. In 
particular the information needed to make the right kind of decisions on cost-benefit 
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grounds when dealing with matters of great uncertainty is problematic. Furthermore, 
the general philosophical worry about aggregations of harms and benefits across 
individual is not addressed.  
  
Non-consquentialist approaches, in particular, rights-based ones, have had a hard time 
even getting started on the topics of risk, since in its most conservative reading, 
imposing risks seen as a harm to others, would simply not be morally permissible 
without consent. Attempts have been made to work around this problem in terms of 
exploring hypothetical forms of consent, introducing compensation, and allowing 
probabilities and aggregation into the rights-based framework, by means of 
constructivism and, most promisingly, prima facie rights. Although reasonable 
successful in a range of ordinary cases, such approaches have their limits in dealing 
with novel, mass risks, such as those of climate change and nuclear power. For these 
more exotic and extreme cases, the general question on how to reconcile individual 
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